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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from final agency action in formal 
proceedings of the Labor Commission under the Administrative Procedures Act and Chapter 2a 
of the Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46-b-16(l) & (2) (2004); 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted Section 
34A-3-110 of the Utah Code to mean that medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to 
apportionment under that provision. 
The standard of review for the Labor Commission's interpretation/application of a statute 
is correction-of-error. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12 ^ 9, 84 P.3d 1201; 
Wood v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 490 \ 5, 128 P.3d 41, 43. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. "As used in this chapter: . . . (3) 'Compensation' means the payments and benefits 
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-102(3)(2005). 
2. The "Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases" provision is set forth 
verbatim in the Addendum to this brief. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is a Petition for Review of the Order Affirming ALJ's Decision (hereinafter 
''Decision") of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated November 30, 2006 
(R.68-70) insomuch as it affirms the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
i 
(hereinafter "Order") of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") dated September 6, 
2006, (R.53-57) and denies the Motion for Review of Petitioners' herein dated October 5, 2006 
(R.58-63). 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
On August 11, 2005, Jeffrey D. Smith (hereinafter "claimant") filed an Application for 
Hearing alternatively claiming industrial accident or occupational disease for a lower back 
condition he claims arose from working "as a meat packer for many years [causing] cumulative 
injury to [his] lower back from excessive bending and lifting of heavy meat." (R.l). Petitioners 
herein, Dale T. Smith & Sons, Inc. and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter, collectively, 
"WCF") answered the Application by generally denying that claimant's "low back condition was 
caused by any work-related accident or exposures."1 (R. 16). 
After discovery, the case proceeded to hearing on July 7, 2006. The parties stipulated 
that the matter should be heard on a theory of occupational disease, not industrial accident. (R. 
68 n.l). Also, claimant withdrew his claims for temporary total disability compensation and 
permanent partial impairment compensation because those issues were resolved by stipulation of 
the parties prior to the hearing. (R. 54). 
On September 6, 2006, the ALJ entered the Order, which determined, inter aha, that 
because the claim was only for medical expenses and because even WCF's medical evidence 
showed that at least thirty-five percent (35%) of claimant's condition was attributable to 
occupational exposures, WCF was liable for payment of all medical expenses because such 
1
 Claimant also joined Libeity Insuiance Corp., an eailiei woikeis compensation msiuance carriei for Dale T Smith 
& Sons, as a lesponclent. At the heaiing, based upon stipulation of the paities, Liberty Insuiance Coip. was 
dismissed as a pait) (R 53, 56) WCF now admits that it is solely liable foi claimant's occupational disease, 
subject to apportionment foi non-employment causes of claimant's low back condition 
2
 Claimant nevei lost any work because of his condition so no tempoiaiy total disability was owed Based upon the 
independent medical examination lepoit and addendum fiom Di Stephen Maible, WCF admitted liability foi 
permanent paitial impaiiment compensation foi seven peicent (7%) of the whole peison 
2 
benefits are not "compensation" under the meaning of Section 34A-3-110 allowing for 
apportionment of "compensation" against non-employment causes of claimant's condition. In 
making this determination, the ALJ relied upon the recent Labor Commission Appeals Board 
Order on Motion for Review in Edmonds v. Epixtech, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August 
29, 2006).3 (R. 55-56). 
On October 5, 2006, WCF filed a Motion for Review before the Labor Commissioner, 
contending that although the ALJ properly applied the holding of Edmonds, Edmonds was 
wrongly decided and should be oveiruled.4 (R. 59-61). Claimant objected to the Motion for 
Review on the grounds that the ALJ and Labor Commission has properly interpreted Section 
34A-3-110 and requested that the matter be heard by the Appeals Board. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-1-303 (3) (2005). (R. 64-65). 
c. Disposition at Agency. 
On November 30, 2006, the Labor Commission Appeals Board rejected WCF's 
contention that Edmonds was wrongly decided and entered the Decision, consisting of two 
pages. (R. 68-69). 
d. Statement of Facts. 
Claimant was employed at Petitioner Dale T. Smith and Sons at an early age in 1978. 
Dale T. Smith is claimant's grandfather, who founded the company as a family business. 
Claimant worked initially cleaning corrals and the plant and then, at age 16 (1982), started 
working part time as a meat cutter. After college, claimant began working full time as a meat 
"' The Edmonds case is now also before this court on a Petition for Review. The case is styled, Ameritech, et al. v. 
Labor Commission, et al., Case No. 20060870. 
4
 WCF also aigued that, because the apportionment was in dispute, that issue should have been refened to a medical 
panel under both statutory and administrative provisions. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601 (2005); Utah Admin. Code 
§ R602-2-2(A)(l) (2006). Since the Appeals Boaid rejected WCF's suggestion that the Labor Commission overrule 
Edmonds, it did not reach this issue. If WCF prevails on this Petition for Review, then, on remand, the Appeals 
Board will still need to consider whether the mattei should be referred to a medical panel. 
cutter. This job required heavy lifting, bending, pushing and pulling of cattle quarters and more. 
(R. 54). 
In 1995, claimant began experiencing low back pain and sought treatment with a 
chiropractor. Claimant periodically obtained chiropractic treatments and other conservative care 
for his low back pain over the years. Then, in 2003, claimant saw Dr. Gordon Kimball, M.D., 
who ultimately referred claimant for an MRI, which disclosed an L5-S1 disk extrusion and 
lumbar degenerative changes, all of which Dr. Kimball attributed to claimant's work activities at 
Dale T. Smith & Sons. (R. 54, 74 [p. 12]). 
During discovery, WCF obtained an independent medical examination from Dr. Stephen 
Marble, M.D. In a report dated April 26, 2006, and an addendum thereto dated May 30, 2006, 
Dr. Marble agreed that most of Smith's L5-S1 injury and some of Smith's lumbar degenerative 
disease were attributable to Smith's work activities at Dale T. Smith and sons. In general, Dr. 
Marble concluded that 35% of Smith's entire low back condition was related to Smith's work 
activities and 65% non-employment causes and conditions. (R. 54-55, 74 [pp. 1-B to 1-C, 8-9]). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Labor Commission did not properly interpret Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code to 
conclude that medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to apportionment, especially 
when considering the plain language of the definition of "compensation" under Section 34A-2-
102(3). Moreover, in Edmonds, which it applied here, the Labor Commission improperly relied 
upon the mle of statutory construction announced in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979) because the factual framework in Kennecott does not 
exist here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE APPEALS BOARD IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
MEDICAL EXPENSES ARE NOT "COMPENSATION" 
SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT UNDER SECTION 34A-3-
110 OF THE UTAH CODE 
In the Order, the ALJ specifically found that "medical benefits are not compensation 
under Section 34A-3-110 and, therefore, not subject to apportionment." (R. 55). The ALJ relied 
upon a recent Labor Commission Appeals Board decision in its Order on Motion for Review in 
Edmonds v. Epixtech, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August 29, 2006). Although WCF 
does not fault the ALJ for following precedent, the Appeals Board inteipretation of 
"compensation" under Section 34A-3-110 in Edmonds, which it reaffirmed in the Decision, is 
misguided. 
Section 34A-3-110 provides that "[t]he compensation payable under this chapter shall be 
reduced and limited" by causes outside employment in the state of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-3-110 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, the key question is whether medical expenses are 
"compensation" within the meaning of Section 34A-3-110. 
"Compensation" is a term of art that has been defined in the Utah Labor Code as follows: 
"'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act." Id., § 34A-2-102(3). Since medical expenses are "benefits" 
under the Occupational Disease Act {see Id., §§ 34A-2-418; 34A-3-102(2); 34A-3-107(2)), it 
then follows that under the plain language of Section 34A-2-102(3)5, medical expenses are 
"compensation" subject to apportionment under Section 34A-3-110. In addition, under the 
^ When mterpieting a statute, the mterpieting agency oi couit must fust look at the plain language of the statute. 
See, Thomas v Calm Countn Management, 2004 LT 12. 1j 9. 84 P 3d 1201, 1205. 
Occupational Disease Act, the legislature explicitly provides that in cases of occupational 
disease, an employer is liable to pay both medical and disability benefits and then in Subsection 
(2) of the same provision, impliedly refers to both types of benefits together as "compensation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-104 (2005). 
Although the Labor Commission previously applied the definition of compensation under 
Section 34A-2-102(3) to determine that medical expenses were "compensation" to be 
apportioned under Section 34A-3-110,6 the Appeals Board has now obviously retreated from 
that standard and now relies on Ketmecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 
(Utah 1979) as its basis for overruling itself. Kennecott, however, is distinguishable. 
In Kennecott, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted "compensation" within the more 
narrow meaning of that tenn in the then statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1953 
version). The supreme court did not consider the more general meaning of "compensation" 
under Section 34A-2-102(3).7 Had the supreme court adopted the more general definition of 
"compensation" under the then version of Section 34A-2-102(3) , it would have rendered the 
statute of limitations regarding indemnity benefits meaningless. In that regard, the supreme 
court stated as follows: 
[I]f the furnishing of or payment for medical expenses by the company, which 
may continue indefinitely, were to extend the limitation in which a claim may 
be filed until three years after the last payment of such medical expense, that 
would completely nullify any effect to be given to Sec. 35-1-99, and thus 
defeat the legislative intent and the purpose of that statute. That would be 
contrary to a cardinal rule of statutory construction: that, if there is uncertainty 
of doubt as to the meaning of statutes, they should be so interpreted and 
implied as to give meaning in effect to both. 
6
 Miliigan v. Utah State Tax Commission, Order on Motion for Review, at 3, Case No. 00-0232. (Labor 
Commissioner, April 3, 2002). 
' Although Section 34A-2-102(3) was numbered differently as Section 35-1-44(6) in the Workers Compensation Act 
and Section 35-2- 12(b) in the Occupational Disease Act when Kennecott was decided in 1979. the basic definition 
has not changed. 
8
 Section 35-1-44. 
fs 
Kennecott Copper Corp., v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Utah 1979) (citing, 
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 253). 
In the instant case, since no conflict is created by applying the more general definition of 
"compensation" under Section 34A-2-102(3), the Labor Commission need not have reverted to 
the rule of statutory instruction stated in Kennecott to resolve a conflict between statutes. 
The narrow applicability of Kennecott is further illustrated in another Utah Supreme 
Court case that determined that "compensation1' does include medical expenses. In Taylor v. 
Industrial Commission, 743 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1987), a claimant sought a determination that 
medical expenses were not "compensation" to which a claim for reimbursement and offset 
against recovery in a Third Party action would be applied under the then version of Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-106 (2005). The supreme court upheld the ALJ and Labor Commission's holding 
that within the meaning of Section 35-1-62 (the then version of Section 34A-2-106), 
"compensation" did include medical expenses. Id., at 1185-86 (citing 2A A. Larsen, Workers' 
Compensation Law § 74.33). Although Taylor did not directly consider the interpretation of 
"compensation" found in Kennecott, it is obvious that the supreme court can and does apply 
differing inteipretations depending upon the context of the statute. Here, as already stated, the 
context of the statute requires the more general definition of compensation under Section 34A-2-
102(3). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse the Decision of the Labor 
Commission and remand the case for further proceedings before the Appeals Board and ALJ. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this c2&^ day of February, 2007. 
A)^~~^ 
Floyd WU/olm, Attorney for Petitioners 
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ADDENDUM 
Text of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 
A 
§ 34A-3-110. Occupational disease aggravated by other diseases 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease 
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational 
disease, or any part of the disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to 
commission jurisdict ion; 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure 
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational 
disease. 
Edmonds v. Epixtech 
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August 29, 2006 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
TAMARA M. EDMONDS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
EPIXTECH,1 AMERICAN PROTECTION 
SERVICES/KEMPERER and 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY,2 
Respondents. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
REVIEW 
Case No. 02-0969 
Tamara M. Edmonds requests review of Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's decision 
regarding Ms. Edmonds claim for benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 
34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for 
review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-12, § 34A-3-102(2) and § 34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On September 3, 2002, Ms. Edmonds filed an occupational disease claim against Epixtech 
alleging that the repetitive stress of her employment had caused carpal tunnel syndrome.3 Judge 
Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing and then referred the medical aspects of Ms. Edmonds' claim to 
a medical panel. The panel submitted its report on September 9, 2004. Ms. Edmonds and American 
each filed objections to the report. 
Judge Marlowe issued her decision on June 28, 2005. Because Ms. Edmonds had neither 
missed work nor shown any pennanent disability from her carpal tunnel syndrome, Judge Marlowe 
did not award any disability compensation to Ms. Edmonds. Regarding Ms. Edmonds' claim for 
1 Ms. Edmonds' employer has been known as "Ameritech Library Sendees," "Dynix," and 
"Epixtech." In this decision, the Appeals Board refers to the company as Epixtech, its name during 
the last period of Ms. Edmonds' employment. 
2 During Mrs. Edmonds' employment, Epixtech was insured by two different insurance earners: 
Continental Casualty from January 1,1989, through December 31,1994; and American Protection 
Services/Kemper from January 1,1995, through January 1, 2000. Reference in the caption of Judge 
Marlowe's decision to Continental Casualty/Kemper is inconect and has been conected. American 
Protection Services/Kemper is refened to as "American" in this decision. 
3 Ms. Edmonds' application also alleged other conditions affecting her neck, back and arms. 
These claims were later abandoned bv Ms. Edmonds. 
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medical benefits, Judge Marlowe's decision addressed American's objection to the panel report, but 
did not address Ms. Edmonds' objection. Judge Marlowe then adopted the panel's conclusion that 
90% of Ms. Edmonds' caipal tunnel syndiome was cdUaul by non-woik uoiidiiions and 10% was 
attributable to work-related aggravation of those non-work conditions. Judge Marlowe ordered 
American to pay 10% of Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses.4 
Ms. Edmonds now requests review of Judge Marlowe's decision on the grounds that: 1) the 
decision does no I address Ms. Edmonds' objections to the medical panel report; and 2) the decision 
improperly limits payment of Ms. Edmonds' medical expenses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The underlying facts of Ms. Edmonds work and the nature of her occupational illness are not 
in dispute. Instead, Ms. Edmonds' motion for review raises primarily procedural and legal questions. 
The Appeals Board therefore adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact. 
DISCUSSION 
Ms. Edmonds' objection to medical panel. Subsection 34A-2-601(l)(b) of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act authorizes ALJs to appoint medical panels to consider the medical 
aspects of occupational disease claims. Subsection 601(2)(d)(ii) of the Act allows the parties to file 
objections to medical panel reports. Ms. Edmonds filed such an objection to the panel report in this 
case but Judge Marlowe did not address that objection. The Appeals Board will therefore consider 
Ms. Edmonds' objection now. 
Ms. Edmonds attacks the panel's attribution of 90% of her carpal tunnel syndrome to non-
work causes. The panel made this allocation based on its statement that carpal tunnel syndrome is 
caused by certain non-work factors. Ms. Edmonds argues that, because she has none of the non-
work factors identified by the panel, it was illogical for the panel to conclude that 90% of her carpal 
tunnel syndrome was caused by such non-work factors. The text of the medical panel's comment 
regarding causes of carpal tunnel syndrome is as follows: 
The primary risk factors leading to carpal tunnel syndrome in the general population 
are non-industrial, and include age, anatomic factors, inherited tissue factors, 
smoking status, endocrine problems, pregnancy, obesity, and inflammatory 
conditions. 
While it is true that not all of the foregoing factors apply to Ms. Edmonds, others do apply. 
Specifically, anatomical and tissue factors that vary from individual to individual can cause carpal 
4 American, rather than Continental, was ordered to pay Ms. Edmond's medical benefits because 
American was the insurance carrier during the period of Ms. Edmonds' last exposure to carpal tunnel 
syndrome at Epixtech. American has not contested its liahilitv 
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tunnel syndrome. Furthermore, the panel's enumeration of risk factors was illustrative rather than 
exhaustive. Considering the report as a whole, with due regard for the panel's impartiality, expertise, 
and familiarity with Ms. Edmonds' entire medical history, the Appeals Board accepts the panel's 
conclusions. 
Apportionment of medical benefits. Judge Marlowe concluded that Ms. Edmonds's medical 
benefit should be limited to 10% of the cost of treatment, based on medical panel's finding that Ms. 
Edmonds' work accounted for 10% of the cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome. Judge Marlowe does 
not explain the basis for her conclusion. The Appeals Board therefore turns to the statutory 
provisions of the Occupational Disease Act. 
Section 34A-3-103 of the Occupational Disease Act defines a "compensable occupational 
disease" as "any disease or illness that arises out of and in the course of employment and is medically 
caused or aggravated by that employment."5 (Emphasis added.) The panel report establishes that 
Ms. Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated by her work at Epixtech. Consequently, Ms. 
Edmonds' carpal tunnel syndrome is a "compensable occupational disease." As such, it triggers 
Epixtech's liability under § 34A-3-104(l) of the Act: 
Every employer is liable for the payment of disability and medical benefits to 
every employee who becomes disabled, or death benefits to the dependents of any 
employee who dies by reason of an occupational disease under the terms of this 
chapter. 
Ms. Edmonds has not shown that her carpal tunnel syndrome caused any disability, but she 
has required medical care. The precise question before the Appeals Board is whether Ms. Edmonds' 
right to payment of her medical expenses is subject to, and reduced by, § 34A-3-110 of the Act.6 
5 In Cook v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 57 P. 3d 1084, 1087 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court 
observed that, for purposes of the Occupational Disease Act, the word "aggravate" does not signify 
causation, but means "to make worse, more serious, or more severe." 
6
 Section 34A-3-110, "Occupational Disease Aggravated By Other Diseases" provides as follows: 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to the 
proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease 
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease, 
or any part of the disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject to 
commission jurisdiction; 
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By its own terms, § 110 only applies to "compensation." Ms. Edmonds argues that this 
precludes the use of § 110 to reduce medical benefits. However, American and Continental argue 
that § 110's use of "compensation" should be interpreted as including disability compensation and 
medical benefits, thereby making Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits subject to § 110's apportionment 
formula. 
hi considering the meaning of "compensation" as used in § 110, the Appeals Board notes that 
§ 102(2) of the Occupational Disease Act provides that "[sjubject to the limitations provided in this 
chapter, and unless otherwise noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act... are 
incorporated into this chapter and shall be applied to occupational disease claims." Thus, in 
considering the meaning of "compensation" for purposes of § 110 of the Occupational Disease Act, 
the Appeals Board notes the definition provided by § 34A-2-102(3) of the Workers' Compensation 
Act: "'Compensation' means the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act." 
The foregoing definition of "compensation" has been part of the Workers' Compensation Act 
since at least 1943 and could be viewed as encompassing both disability compensation and medical 
benefits. However, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the term "compensation" did not include medical benefits. 
Because § 110 was enacted after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kennecott, ibid., the 
Appeals Board assumes that the Legislature intended the word "compensation" as used in § 110 to 
have the meaning as was given in the Kennecott decision. The Appeals Board therefore concludes 
that medical benefits do not fall within § 110's use of the term "compensation" and are not subject to 
§110's apportionment formula. 
The foregoing conclusion is consistent with the well-established principle that the Act must 
be liberally construed in favor of payment of benefits. The conclusion is also supported by the fact 
that the degree of apportionment under §110 depends upon the application of the ratio of work-
related disability and non-work disability, hi cases such as this, where there is no disability and only 
medical benefits are due, § 110's apportionment formula would be impossible to apply. 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure 
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational 
disease. 
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Summary. The Appeals Board has considered Ms. Edmonds' objection to the medical 
panel's report, but for the reasons stated herein, accepts the medical panel's opinion. The Appeals 
Board concludes that Ms. Edmonds' medical benefits are not subject to apportionment under § 34A-
3-110 of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board modifies the first paragraph of Judge Marlowe's 
order, found at page 10 of her decision, as follows: 
It is hereby ordered that respondents Epixtech and American Protection 
Services /Kemper are liable for the reasonable expense of medical care necessary to 
treat Tamara Edmonds' bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. 
The Appeals Board affirms the remaining portions of Judge Marlowe's decision. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this gffi day of August, 2006. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
^atricia S. Drawe 
mJLi 
Jofedph E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motion For Review in the matter of Tamara 
M. Edmonds, Case No. 02-0969, was mailed first class postage prepaid this £$ day of August, 
2006, to the following: 
Tamara M. Edmonds 
633 N 1000E 
MapletonUT 84664 
Epixtech 
400 W 5050 N 
ProvoUT 84604 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
160E300S3rdFl 
Salt Lake City UT 84114 
Phillip Shell, Esq. 
45 E Vine St 
Murray UT 84107 
Theodore Kanell, Esq. 
136 ES Temple Ste 1700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Bret M. Hanna, Esq. 
170 S Main St Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Thomas Sturdy, Esq. 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
Milligan v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
Labor Commissioner Decision, 
April 30, 2002 
r 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
MERICIA MILLIGAN, 
Applicant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Defendants. 
The Utah State Tax Commission and its workers compensation insurance carrier, the 
Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly as "Tax Commission") asks the Utah Labor 
Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's award of benefits to Mericia Milligan under 
the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §34A-
3-102(2) of the Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (3) and Utah Admin. 
CodeR602-2-l.M. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The Tax Commission raises two issues for Commission review: 1) Should the medical panel 
appointed by the ALJ in this matter be instructed to consider a specific medical research article 
proffered by the Tax Commission; and 2) should the Tax Commission's liability for Mrs. Milligan's 
medical expenses be limited to the proportion by which her work at the Tax Commission caused her 
occupational disease. 
BACKGROUND 
Mrs. Milligan claims medical and disability compensation under the Utah Occupational 
Disease Act for medical problems generally related to the overuse of her arms and hands. As 
required by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(l)(b), the ALJ referred the medical aspects of Mrs. 
Milligan's claim to an independent medical panel for evaluation. The panel concluded that Mrs. 
Milligan suffers from severe recurrent stenosing tenosynovitis in her arms and has incurred a 14% 
whole person impairment from all causes. The medical panel attributed 80% of Mrs. Milligan's 
disease to her work at the Tax Commission and 20% to nonwork activities. 
After receiving the medical panel's report, the Tax Commission asked that the panel be 
directed to review a particular medical research article addressing the relationship, or lack thereof, 
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between computer use and carpal tunnel syndrome.1 The ALJ denied the Tax Commission's request 
and adopted the medical panel's report as issued. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Request for medical panel review of research article. The Commission affirms the ALTs 
refusal to instruct the medical panel to consider a particular research article. The Commission and 
its ALJs rely on medical panels because of their medical expertise. It is a panel's responsibility and 
prerogative to determine the resources to be used in conducting its evaluation. Whether a panel has 
properly discharged its function can be tested by contrary medical opinion and, in appropriate cases, 
medical panel hearings. In this case, the Commission sees no need to intervene in the regular 
processes of the medical panel system. 
Apportionment of medical expenses. As already noted, Mrs. Milligan's medical problems 
are caused 80% by her work at the Tax Commission and 20%) by personal non-work activities. The 
Tax Commission contends that under these circumstances the plain language of §34A-3-l 10 of the 
Occupational Disease Act limits the Tax Commission's liability for Mrs. Milligan's medical 
expenses. 
Section 34A-3-110 of the Occupational Disease Act provides as follows: 
The compensation payable under this chapter shall be reduced and limited to 
the proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease 
were the sole cause of disability or death, as the occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of the disability or death when the occupational disease, 
or any part of the disease: 
(1) is causally related to employment with a non-Utah employer not subject 
to commission jurisdiction; 
(2) is of a character to which the employee may have had substantial exposure 
outside of employment or to which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to by an occupational 
disease. 
'The Frequency of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome In Computer Users At A Medical Facility" 
published in the medical journal Neurology on June 12, 2001. 
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The Commission notes that the foregoing apportionment statute only applies to those claims 
which meet one or more of the conditions described in subsections (1) through (4). The 
circumstances of Mrs. Milligan's claim satisfy subsections (2), (3) and (4). Consequently, Mrs. 
Milligan's claim is subject to the apportionment provisions of §34A-3-110. 
Having determined that Mrs. Milligan's occupational disease claim is subject to §34A-3-
110's apportionment formula, the Commission must determine whether §34A-3-110's use of the term 
"compensation" includes medical expenses. "Compensation" is defined by §34A-2-102(3) of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act2 as "the payments and benefits provided for in this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act." Section 34A-3-107(2) of the Occupational Disease Act, 
in conjunction with §34A-2-418 of the Workers' Compensation Act, require payment of medical 
expenses. It seems clear to the Commission that medical expenses are, therefore, both a "payment" 
and a "benefit" so as to constitute a component of "compensation" which must be apportioned 
pursuant to §343A-3-110. 
In applying the apportionment formula of §34A-3-l 10 to Mrs. Milligan's medical expenses, 
the Commission notes that 80% of Mrs. Milligan's medical problems, as identified in the medical 
panel report, are caused by her work at the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission's liability for 
payment of expenses for medical care necessary to treat such problems is therefore limited to 80% 
of such expenses. 
ORDER 
The Commission hereby grants the Tax Commission's motion for review with respect to the 
apportionment of Mrs. Milligan's medical expenses and amends paragraph five of the ALJ's 
"Order," found at page 12 of the ALJ's decision, as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, State of Utah Tax Commission and 
Workers Compensation Fund shall pay 80% of all medical expenses necessary to treat the 
petitioner's occupational disease in accordance with the relative value schedule of the Labor 
Commission, as outlined above. Such payments shall included interest at 8% per annum from the 
date each charge was originally billed in accordance with Labor Commission rules. 
2 
Section 34A-3-102(2) of the Occupational Disease Act provides that "(s)ubject to the 
limitations provided in this chapter and, unless otherwise noted, all provisions of Chapter 2, 
Workers' Compensation Act, . . . are incorporated into this chapter and shall be applied to 
occupational disease claims." 
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Except as noted above, the Commission denies the remainder of the Tax Commission's 
motion for review and affirms the other portions of the ALJ's decision. It is so ordered. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Mericai Milligan, Case No. 2000232, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ja ^"day of 
CMpNTH)T2002, to the following: 
MERICIA MILLIGAN 
587 E1550S 
KAYSVILLE UT 84037 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
210 NORTH 1950 WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84134 
BARBARA SHARP 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157-0929 
MICHAEL BELNAP 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2610 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDENUT 84401 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
ah/mr/heading/00-0232 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
D 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
POBox 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
801-530-6800 
JEFFREY D SMITH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DALE T SMITH AND SONS and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 05-0707 
Judge Debbie L. Hann 
HEARING: Room 332 Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
. on July 7, 2006 at 8:30 AM. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Jeffrey D Smith, was present and represented by his/her 
attorney Phillip Shell Esq. 
The respondents, Dale T Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation 
Fund, were represented by attorney Floyd Holm Esq. The respondents, 
Dale T Smith and Sons and Liberty Insurance Corp were represented by 
attorney Bret Gardner Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner's Application for Hearing alleges entitlement to medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total compensation and permanent partial compensation as the result of 
a cumulative trauma injury and an occupational disease to the petitioner's low back. The 
Commission issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings & Order for Answer on August 
17, 2005. Both Answers denied the petitioner had suffered a compensable injury or occupational 
disease. 
Prior to the hearing, Liberty Insurance Corp, filed a motion to dismiss itself as a party to the 
proceedings. This motion was granted at the hearing based upon the stipulation of the parties. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Jeffrey D Smith vs. Dale T Smith And Sons and/or Workers Compensation Fund; Liberty 
Insurance Corp 
Case No. 05-0707 
Page 2 
At the hearing, the petitioner withdrew its claims for compensation as those issues had been 
resolved leaving the medical claim as outstanding. The only issue remaining as to medical 
expenses is the apportionment between industrial and non-industrial causes. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The petitioner is employed by the respondent, a family business. He began at age 12 after school 
cleaning corrals and the plant. He began working part time as a meat cutter at age 16 and then 
began working full time as a meat cutter when he joined the business full time following college. 
Generally, this employment required the petitioner to regularly lift and manipulate quarters of 
beef weighing 100-200 pounds, haul live cattle, including "downer" cows that required the 
petitioner to prod, shock, push, pull, lift and twist to get these immobile cows into trailers The 
petitioner is now age 40 and suffers from lumbar degenerative joint disease. 
The petitioner sought treatment for low back pain in August 1995 and was diagnosed with 
"sciatic neuralgia" by Dr. Egbert, a chiropractor. The petitioner sought treatment for low back 
pain off and on with chiropractors over the years. 
On September 22, 2003, the petitioner sought treatment with Dr. Kimball for, among other 
things, low back pain. He was assessed with a lumbar sprain and an MRI was recommended. 
Medical exhibit 15. The MRI was done on September 26, 2003 and revealed the L5-S1 disc 
extrusion and lumbar degenerative changes but the petitioner did not get the results of this report 
until February 2004. Medical exhibit 77-78, 14. 
The petitioner told his father and uncles, the owners of Dale T. Smith and Sons, about his back 
condition as the result of the heaving lifting at work. The petitioner reported back pain as the 
result of heavy lifting to his family members over the years of working. The petitioner 
characterized Dr. Kimball's report to him as having the back of "a 65 year old man" and when he 
realized he had more than a temporary back strain, he reported his condition to his father and 
uncles. The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, filed a first report of injury in September 2004 
after the petitioner expressed concern that his claim might not be covered for lack of notice. 
The respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, received timely notice of the petitioner's claim. 
Whether a first report was timely prepared by the employer is not within the control of the 
employee who reported his industrial back condition, progressing from temporary strains to the 
current claim of lumbar degenerative disc disease. 
Dr. Kimball attributed the petitioner's L5-S1 ruptured disc and narrowing at L4-5 and L2-3 to 
"years of rigorous work ex: lifting, turning, pulling." Medical exhibit 13. 
Dr. Marble opined that 75% of the petitioner's L5-S1 condition was caused by his work activities 
and that 25% of the other lumbar degenerative changes were caused by work activities. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Jeffrey D Smith vs. Dale T Smith And Sons and/or Workers Compensation Fund; Liberty 
Insurance Corp 
Case No. 05-0707 
Page 3 
Medical exhibit 9. In a subsequent addendum to his original report, Dr. Marble apportioned 35% 
of the petitioner's "entire overall low back condition" to his work activities and 75% to non-
industrial conditions. Dr. Marble assigned a 7% whole person impairment for the petitioner's 
L5-S1 disk condition fully to the petitioner's work activities. Medical exibit 1-B. 
The petitioner's employment activities with the respondent, Dale T. Smith and Sons, caused in 
full or in part, the petitioner's degenerative lumbar disc disease. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
A compensable occupational disease is "... any disease or illness that arises out of and in the 
course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment." Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-3-103. 
Utah Code § 34A-3-108(2) outlines the petitioner's reporting obligation for an occupational 
disease: 
(2) (a) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division 
within 180 days after the cause of action arises is barred from any claim of benefits 
arising from the occupational disease. 
(b) The cause of action is considered to arise on the date the employee first suffered 
disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by employment. 
Utah Code § 34A-3-110 outlines when "compensation" should be apportioned to account for 
other non-compensable contributing causes. In Edmonds v. Epixtech et ah, Case No. 02-0969 
(issued 8/29/06)1, the Commission Appeals Board ruled that medical benefits are not 
compensation under § 34A-3-110 and therefore not subject to apportionment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner suffered a compensable occupational disease, degenerative lumbar disc disease, 
while employed by the respondent, Dale T. Smiths and Sons. 
The respondent, Liberty Insurance Co., is dismissed as a party to this claim. 
1
 This case appears to overrule the holding in Milligan v. Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 00-0232 (issued 
4/30/02). 
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The respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers Compensation Fund, are liable to the 
petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the petitioner's low back condition 
pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Dale T. Smith and Sons and Workers 
Compensation Fund, pay the petitioner for reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the 
petitioner's low back condition pursuant to the Commission RBRVS fee schedule. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, Liberty Insurance Co, is dismissed as a party 
to this claim. 
DATED September 6, 2006. / ~ 
Debbie L. Hann 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division 
of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for 
review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is 
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days 
of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on September 6, 2006, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
(\no 
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Phillip Shell Esq 
45 E Vine St 
Murray UT 84107 
Bret Gardner Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Floyd Holm Esq 
392 E 6400 S 
P O Box 57929 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
UTAH-LABOR COMMISSION 
Clerk, Adjudication Division 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JEFFREY D. SMITH, 1 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DALE T. SMITH & SONS and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALJ'S DECISION 
Case No. 05-0707 
Dale T. Smith & Sons and its insurance carrier, Workeis Compensation Fund (referred to 
jointly as "Smith & Sons" hereafter), request review of Administrative Law Judge Hann's decision 
awarding medical benefits to Jeffrey D. Smith under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; 
Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §63-46b-12, §34A-2-801(3) and §34A-3-102. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Jeffrey Smith seeks payment of medical expenses necessary to treat his degenerative low 
back condition.1 Smith & Sons contends that Mr. Smith's low back condition should be 
apportioned between work and non-work causes and that Smith & Son's liability for medical 
expenses should be limited accordingly. 
In her decision of September 6, 2006, Judge Hann denied Smith & Sons' request for 
apportionment of Mr. Smith's medical expenses. In doing so, she relied on the Appeals Board's 
decision in Tamara Edmonds v. Epixtech, et al. (Labor Commission Case No. 02-0969; issued 
August 29, 2006), which held that medical expenses are not subject to the apportionment provisions 
of §34A-3-l 10 of the Act. In seeking review of Judge Hann's decision, Smith & Sons argues that 
Edmonds was wrongly decided. 
l Initially, Mr. Smith originally filed alternative claims for medical benefits and disability 
compensation under both the Utah Occupational Disease Act and the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. Mr. Smith also named Liberty Insurance Corp. as a respondent. Liberty was later dismissed 
from these proceedings and the remaining parties resolved Mr. Smith's claim for disability 
compensation. Consequently, the only remaining issue is Mr. Smith's right to payment of medical 
expenses. With the apparent consent of the parties, Judge Hann adjudicated that issue under the 
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
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DISCUSSION 
In Edmonds the Appeals Board concluded that §34A-3-1 i O's use of the term "compensation" 
for purposes of apportionment must be understood in light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Kemiecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979), which held that 
compensation did not include medical benefits. The Appeals Board further concluded that this 
interpretation was supported by the principle that the Act must be liberally construed and the 
impossibility of applying §34A-3-l 10's apportionment provision to medical-only claims. 
Having visited this issue once again, the Appeals Board believes the reasoning followed in 
Edmonds is correct. Under that reasoning, Mr. Smith's medical expenses are not subject to 
apportionment under §34A-3-l 10. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms Judge Hann's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this 'st) day of November, 2006. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
Patricia S. Drawe 
Josepl^E. Hatch 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Jeffrey 
D. Smith, Case No. 05-0707, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ?>() "day of November, 
2006, to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Smith 
655 E 12500S 
Draper UT 84020 
Dale T. Smith & Sons 
12450 Pony Express 
Draper UT 84020 
Liberty Insurance Corp 
175 Berkeley St 
Boston MA 02117 
Floyd Holm, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund 
392 E 6400 S 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
Phillip Shell, Esq. 
45 E Vine St 
Murray UT 84107 
Bret Gardner, Esq. 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
MM NMiMk 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
